Cyber-Physical Systems Safety

Today's cyber-physical systems, such as cars and airplanes, are transforming rapidly into complex, networked computing systems that control physical systems electronically. This increased complexity often leads to bugs and security vulnerabilities. The network connectivity opens these vulnerable systems to remote software attacks. In order to address the increasing security concern, G. Edward Suh and his co-researchers want to develop mechanisms and tools that will provide provable security assurance for safety-critical functions of cyber-physical systems.

The researchers study an autonomous vehicle as a primary example and develop techniques that enable designers to obtain a quantitative guarantee for avoiding collisions, even when parts of the system cannot be trusted. 

They design architecture that ensures safety-critical functions are not maliciously affected by untrusted parts, developing verification methods to prove security properties of both hardware and software. They also develop and analyze collision avoidance algorithms and their safety assurance.

The project takes an integrated approach to co-designing all major components of a system— hardware, software, and safety-critical control algorithms—through synergistic collaborations across multiple disciplines. 

Cornell Researchers

Funding Received

$1 Million spanning 3 years

Sponsored by

Other Research Sponsored by National Aeronautics and Space Administration